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PREFAC E

uantum mechanics has raised in an acute form three problems whic h
g o to the heart of man's relationship with nature through experimenta l
science : (1) the public objectivity of science, that is, its value as a
universal science for all investigators ; (2) the empirical objectivity o f
scientific objects, that is, man's ability to construct a precise or causa l
;patio-temporal model of microscopic systems ; and finally (3), th e
formal objectivity of science, that is, its value as an expression of wha t
nature is independently of its being an object of human knowledge .
These are three aspects of what is generally called the "crisis of ob
jectivy
" or the "crisis of realism" in modern physics .
This crisis is studied in the light of Werner Heisenberg's work .
Heisenberg was one of the architects of quantum mechanics, and w e
lave chosen his writings as the principal source-material for this study.
Among physicists of the microscopic domain, no one except perhap s
Bohr has expressed himself so abundantly and so profoundly on th e
philosophy of science as Heisenberg . His writings, both technical and
Ion-technical, show an awareness of the mysterious element i n
scientific knowledge, far from the facile positivism of Bohr and other s
)f his contemporaries . The mystery of human knowledge and huma n
subjectivity is for him an abiding source of wonder . Heisenberg is far
from the naive realism of the great scientists of the past, yet too muc h
)f an empirical investigator to espouse the deductionism of Spinoza an d
Leibniz which exerted such a pull, for example, on the elder Einstein .
Et is not surprising then that he situates himself uneasily within th e
perspective of critical philosophy, but of critical philosophy in crisis .
For this reason, the modern European continental philosopher feel s
:closerthimnpadoes,rhpiAnglo-mercaut
)art .
The epistemology of quantum mechanics has up to now been studie d
almost exclusively through the works of Bohr and many studies and
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doctoral theses exist in English of Bohr's philosophy . Heisenberg' s
philosophy has been curiously untouched . I surmise for a number of
reasons . In the first place, he has always declared his attachment t o
the Copenhagen School and implied that he shared Bohr's philosoph y
of science . In fact, as this study shows, his philosophical outlook ,
except for a short period when he collaborated closely with Bohr, wa s
very different and became increasingly so with the passage of time . In
the second place, he is the most metaphysical of modern scientists an d
the genre of philosophical writing on physics in recent years has bee n
dominated by a British and American school which tends to plac e
metaphysics somewhere between mysticism and crossword puzzles .
The method employed exclusively in this work, and outlined i n
chapter one, is that of an analysis of "horizons", that is, of the kin d
of cognitive intentionality-structure implicit in the conduct of a
systematic investigation . The kind of investigation we are intereste d
in is, of course, a scientific investigation. An intentionality-structure is
composed of a noetic and a noematic aspect which are correlative t o
one another . The noetic aspect is an open field of connected scientifi c
questions addressed to empirical experience ; the noematic aspect is the
response obtained by scientific experiment from experience . The
totality of actual and possible answers constitutes a horizon of actual
and possible objects of human knowledge and this we call a World. The
World is the source of meaning of the word "real" . "Real" is then
defined as what makes its appearance directly or indirectly as one o f
the objects in the World . But as objects can be of many kinds, th e
sense of "real" also is ambiguous . We find it necessary to distinguis h
different classes of objects : public and private objects, intelligible an d
sensible objects, empirical, phenomenal and bodily objects, objects o f
mere thought or supposition and, finally, objects in the strict (o r
formal) sense which are affirmed as beings or noumena .
We found it necessary to distinguish reality from the criterion of
reality for us, and real from being. The two traditional extremes of
empiricism and rationalism can then be defined with respect to th e
horizon of objects conceived to constitute the World of real things .
Empiricism identifies the real with being and both with objects o f
empirical intuition, that in, with bodies . The meaning of real and th e
criterion of reality are identified . Rationalism identifies being with
intelligible object, and tends to employ the term "real" for the object
of empirical intuition, which, however, is regarded as alien to being .
With this schema, it is possible to trace the movement of Heisenberg's
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thought, that is, the changing meaning he gave to such key words a s
reality, being and objectivity, during the critical period of the development of quantum mechanics and the subsequent modification of hi s
position as he grew older .
Our point of departure is the horizon of classical physics into which
Heisenberg entered as a young student and which is the epitome o f
extreme rationalism .
Chapter two is an account of the historical origin of the quantum
theory in its two forms ; the quantum mechanics of Werner Heisenber g
and the wave mechanics of Erwin Schrodinger . Heisenberg's discover y
of quantum mechanics was accompanied by a dramatic insight into th e
structure of physical science : a quantity which could not be observe d
in principle (a non-observable quantity) should not be part of a physica l
theory . This discovery brought about the first major change in the intentionality-structure of physics since the time of Galileo . Heisenberg's
master-insight implied a conversion from the rationalist intentionalit y
characteristic of classical physics to a predominantly empiricist one . A
major influence in the explicit formulation of this change of outloo k
was Bohr whose principle of complementarity was eventually (and
reluctantly at first) accepted by Heisenberg .
In chapter three, we analyse the philosophy of complementarity a s
sketched first of all in Bohr's works and then in the early writings o f
Heisenberg . We find that it includes a theory of scientific method ,
and a philosophical outlook on reality, objectivity and causality.
In chapters four and five, we are concerned with an exposition an d
critique of the complementarity account of scientific method . In th e
first place, complementarity states that our concepts of physica l
properties have basically the same logical structure as those of every day life . This thesis, depends upon a theory of knowledge called psychophysical parallelism. We show that there are two logically different sets
of concepts in every physical theory ; a set founded upon relations to us
(operational and observational concepts) and a set founded upon relation s
to things (explanatory concepts) . Because of this, psycho-physica l
parallelism is not a satisfactory account of scientific knowing . More over, the place of observable symbols (pointer readings, etc .) and their
counterpart in mathematical symbols is not sufficiently accounted for i n
the complementarity view of scientific method .
The second problem in scientific method concerns the function of th e
measurement process in physics . Heisenberg implies that, since it i s
part of the activity whereby we contact and so observe physical reality,
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it has a disturbing effect on reality and tends to limit our access to th e
objective properties of atomic realities (This is the perturbation theory of
measurement) . In keeping with the distinctions we have made betwee n
properties-for-us and properties-for-things, we assert that th e
measuring process is essential to the definition of a physical propert y
as a property-for-things . Hence the so-called perturbation is a n
essential element in its definition ; it is not extrinsic to the objectiv e
property nor has it anything to do with a limitation of our access t o
physical reality .
The third problem (chapter five) . in scientific method concerns th e
public objectivity of quantum mechanics . Heisenberg asserts th e
inescapable presence of a "subjective element" in the quantu m
theory. By this he means two things : (i) the failure of the (Kantian )
category of "substance" for an atomic system (from which it follow s
that an atomic system cannot be given a "realistic" description o f
universal validity, i .e., for all observers), and (ii) that the act o f
observation – as a private conscious act – resulting in the "reduction o f
the wave packet" effects the suppression of physical correlations (o r
superposition states) and so changes a physical aspect of reality .
With respect to (i), we answer by distinguishing between th e
observable symbol (which may or may not constitute a coherent causally
related phenomenal object) and the thing or property symbolised (whose
consistency is to be judged by the non-contradictory character of th e
mathematical theory, and whose reality is manifested through a n
observable symbol) . With respect to (ii), we defend the view that th e
formation of a mixture from a pure case is a logical operation determine d
by the antecedent choice of the kind of experimental data to be observed and that any physical changes effected are consequences of th e
activity whereby the measuring instruments are set up and the result s
obtained .
The intervention of the scientist-observer's subjectivity then is n o
different in quantum physics than in classical physics. The nature of
the quantum physical object, however, is different ; for, while in
classical physics this is an idealised normative (and hence abstract)
object, in quantum physics the object is an individual instance of an
idealised norm . In classical physics, differences of individual instance s
from the ideal norm are treated by a statistical "theory of errors" ; i n
quantum physics the "errors" of conjugate properties are found to b e
concretely linked and for this reason the statistical part of a quantu m
mechanical explanation cannot be separated from its non-statistical
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)art . An atomic system, then, is represented in the quantum theory b y
, virtual ensemble in which both the physical variables (a
sproeti-hngs)adeirtbuonsaheirm(oxpctai
n
values) are linked within one unitary formalism . The Indeterminacy
Relations are expressions of the concrete character of the object o f
quantum mechanics and of the interrelated character of the "errors "
of conjugate quantities .
During the course of our attempt to separate the physiognomy o f
he strict object from the matrix of scientific methodology in which it
makes its appearance, we demonstrate the thesis that no physical thin g
)r property in so far as this is an explanatory element in physics –
vhether it be in classical or in quantum physics – is per se representabl e
n sensibility (i .e., per se observable) . It becomes per accidens observable
only through the occurrence of appropriate observable symbol s
asocitedunmbgslywithepcaobjtinques
.
In chapter six, we discuss various opinions on the essence of th e
Correspondence Principle which relates classical and quantum physic s
n limiting cases. We point out that the ambiguity in the various view s
s due to the multiplicity of possible limiting processes by which a
classical theory can be obtained from a quantum theory ; for beside s
:he vanishing of the quantum of action limiting procedures can als o
)e applied to the rules of correspondence (or interpretation) which link
:he mathematical formalism to experimental observations . For
example, if the quantum rules are retained, then a classical statistica l
)article theory is obtained : if, however, the quantum rules are change d
;o as to make the operators correspond to numerical averages o f
quantities taken over a small interval of time at a given epoch, then
classical particle mechanics is obtained . On the basis of thes
cfaootrimnphlseetwqnuvsdri y
econsidr
.
h
Part II, comprising chapters seven, eight and nine, is concerned wit
the ontological structure of atomic systems . Chapter seven examine s
various notions current among physicists on the meaning of reality and
its criterion for us. These are divided for convenience into two classes :
one of predominantly rationalistic tendency of which Einstein (Senior)
s chosen as a classic example, and another of predominantly empiricist
tendency, illustrated by some aspects of Wigner's thought .
In chapter eight, we consider Heisenberg's ontology at length . From
an early and predominantly empiricist phase, he passed to a pre dominantly rationalist viewpoint on nature ; not, however, back to th e
rationalism of Cartesian mechanism, but to one inspired almost totally
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by the transcendental philosophy of Kant. We find that he is als o
strongly influenced by Plato, while his more recent adoption o f
Aristotelian terminology (of the terms dunamis or potentia, and universal or primary substance or matter) does not really indicate a significant change in his outlook . It provided him, however, with a solution
to the problem of what noumenal reality to associate with a quantu m
mechanical system like an elementary particle . The noumenal realit y
associated with a quantum mechanical system is, he says, a dunamis
(or potentia or objective tendency) related to the act of observation . The
act of observation completes its actuality by actualising one of th e
possibilities (or eigenstates) represented by its state vector . Heisenberg
also identifies energy with Aristotelian primary matter . Heisenberg's
Practical Realism, as he calls his philosophy, remains however a
Kantian type idealism .
In chapter nine, we present our solution to the problem of th e
objective realism of a scientific theory . First of all, the notion of reality
is examined in the light of the polymorphism of human cognitive
activity. This enables us to overcome the fundamental and unharmonised duality (part empiricist and part rationalist) in Heisenberg' s
thought . We show that the structure of human cognitive activity i s
realistic . We next examine the relationship of a part (e .g., the nucleus )
to the whole (e .g., of an atom) in a compound microscopic system . We
find that the part is not an actual part, but can be called a virtual part .
We examine also the function of energy in physics as a universa l
invariant. We find that energy has not the properties of an Aristotelia n
prime matter, but is a condition of possibility characteristic of a
particular physical milieu and that it governs the kinds of systems an d
processes permitted by the milieu .
In Part III (or chapter ten), we gather together synthetically th e
clues suggested by the preceding analysis on the logical structure of a
physical theory . We find that physics as a science depends upon th e
articulation of two Worlds : a World-for-us (described by operational or
observational concepts) and a World-for-things (described by explanatory
concepts) . The duality of World explains the use by the physicist of tw o
languages : an observation language and an explanatory language .
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